Rape and the Exception in Turkish and
International Law by Miller, Ruth A.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 64 | Issue 4 Article 4
Fall 9-1-2007
Rape and the Exception in Turkish and
International Law
Ruth A. Miller
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Law and Gender
Commons, Religion Law Commons, and the Sexuality and the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ruth A. Miller, Rape and the Exception in Turkish and International Law, 64 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1349
(2007), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol64/iss4/4




This Comment suggests, first, that Turkey's new (2004) rape law is
indebted to recent trends in international sexual legislation, and second, that
both Turkish and international rape law are in turn the product of a century of
European exceptionalism. The 2004 Turkish criminal code is a text that has
redefined the Turkish state's approach to issues ranging from torture to
corruption to immigrant smuggling to rape and adultery. Fundamentally a
domestic document, it is aimed at rearticulating and liberalizing the state-
citizen relationship in Turkey. At the same time, it is emphatically an
international text-a spectacle geared toward moving Turkey one step closer to
European Union membership. As such, Turkey's criminal code is arguably
political-representative of a twenty-first century collapse of law into ideology
and a twenty-first century variation on the primacy of the sovereign decision in
jurisprudence-even as it is couched in the apparent triumph of neutral,
objective European liberalism. In other words, the 2004 criminal code is
simultaneously an example of the exceptionalism first theorized by writers such
as Carl Schmitt. This Comment begins with a brief history of the state of
exception in Europe. It then links international rape law to these theories of
exceptionalism. It turns to rape law in Turkey and the ways in which this law
is indebted to both international law and the European history of
exceptionalism, and it concludes by asking whether Turkey's aspirations to
* Assistant Professor of History, University of Massachusetts, Boston. I would like to
thank Professor Louise Halper for inviting me to contribute to the Washington and Lee School
of Law Symposium on Gender-Relevant Legislative Change in Muslim and Non-Muslim
Countries and for encouraging me to develop this research project. I am also grateful to the
other participants in the Symposium for their insightful comments on my work. Finally, I
should note that I develop many of the arguments presented in this Comment in much greater
detail in RUTH A. MILLER, THE LIMITS OF BODILY INTEGRITY: ABORTION, ADULTERY, AND RAPE
LEGISLATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (2007).
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join the European Union are worth situating the nation's rape legislation
within this problematic history of authoritarianism in Europe.
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I. Introduction
My starting point in this Comment is the 2004 Turkish criminal code-a
text that has redefined the Turkish state's approach to issues ranging from
torture and corruption to immigrant smuggling, rape, and adultery.' The 2004
criminal code is fundamentally a domestic document, aimed at rearticulating
and liberalizing the state-citizen relationship in Turkey.2 At the same time, it is
an emphatically international text-a deliberate spectacle geared toward
moving Turkey one step closer to European Union membership and thus, one
step closer to "Western Civilization. '3 As such, Turkey's criminal code is
1. Yeni Tulrk Ceza Kanunu: Cinsel Dokunulmazllga Kar~l Sular [New Turkish
Criminal Code: Crimes Against Sexual Inviolability/Bodily Integrity] [2004] [TCK] 6:5237
(Turk.), available at http://www.hukuki.net/kanun/5237.15.text.asp (last visited Oct. 19,2007)
[hereinafter New Turkish Criminal Code] (all translations of the text of the New Turkish
Criminal Code are by the author).
2. For instance, an editorial in the Turkish mass daily newspaper, Hiirriyet, argues that
the criminal code is the product of at least one hundred years of women's rights activism in
Turkey, and that it should not be presented as a response to European Union membership
requirements. Emel Armutgu, Degiiklikler AB iqin degil kahverengi gdzlerimiz i~inyaplmali
[The Changes Should Not Be for the European Union butfor Our Own Brown Eyes], HORRIYET
(Turk.), Sept. 5, 2004, http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr/arsivnews.aspx?id=254973 (last visited Sept.
11, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
3. For an overt example of the new criminal code as a spectacle, see Bat basint: TCK
reformu Tirkiye 'yiAB 'ye yakinla~ttriyor [Western Press: The Reform of the Turkish Criminal
Code is Moving Turkey Closer to the European Union], HURRIYET (Turk.), Sept. 27, 2004,
http://arama.hurriyet.com.tr /arsivnews.aspx?id=260577 (last visited Sept. 12, 2007) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The article analyzes the "western media" reaction
to the criminal code's promulgation and tries to determine how much "closer" Turkey now is to
Europe. Id.
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unquestionably political-representative of the close relationship between law
and citizenship formation, between the elaboration of legal norms and the
"post-democratic spectac[le]"4 that deprives these norms of all but their political
meaning. Although the 2004 criminal code is couched in a rhetoric of neutral,
objective European liberalism, I suggest that it is simultaneously a product of
the exceptionalism first theorized by writers such as Carl Schmitt.
This Comment is divided into three parts, each addressing the various
ways in which Turkey's rape law is the inheritor of a long-standing tradition of
European exceptionalism and liberalism. Part II sketches, in broad strokes, a
few defining characteristics of the state of exception as it has been theorized by
twentieth and twenty-first century legal scholars. Part III addresses
international rape law and its implicit demand for a state of exception. Finally,
Part IV discusses the Turkish code itself and its debt to this international
legislation. I suggest that both Turkish law and international law irrevocably
politicize the bodies of citizens, that they turn these citizens into exceptional
space, and that they thus represent a classically authoritarian appropriation of
sexuality even while they speak the language of the liberal rule of law.
II. European Exceptionalism
A reasonable place to begin a discussion of European exceptionalism is
the opening sentence of Political Theology, where Carl Schmitt argues that a
sovereign is "he who decides on the exception." 5 This interpretation of the
relationship between sovereignty and exceptionalism has been extraordinarily
6
influential in recent analyses of authoritarian legal and political structures.
According to Schmitt, deciding on the state of exception--deciding when the
rule of law will be suspended or when law will collapse into politics-is the
most fundamental of sovereign rights.7 Sovereign existence indeed relies upon
the state of exception, and, as Schmitt continues, the relationship between
sovereignty and exceptionalism is identical to the relationship between divinity
4. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE 10 (Daniel
Heller-Roazen trans., Stanford Univ. Press 1998) (1995).
5. CARL ScHMITr, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY 5 (George Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922).
6. Giorgio Agamben, for instance, begins his 2005 book, State of Exception, with the
same phrase. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION 1 (Kevin Attell trans., Univ. of Chi.
Press 2005) (2005).
7. See SCHMrIr, supra note 5, at 7 ("[The sovereign] decides whether there is an extreme
emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it.").
1351
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1349 (2007)
and the miraculous.8  "The exception in jurisprudence," he argues, "is
analogous to the miracle in theology,"9 and just as the divine suspension of the
laws of nature both defines and constitutes God, so too the sovereign
suspension of the sovereign's law defines and constitutes sovereignty.' 0 Each
shatters a system of objective legal norms but, in doing so, each demonstrates
the higher existence of law/sovereignty or law/divinity. What Schmitt is trying
to do in his discussion, therefore, is to reintroduce this particularly miraculous
aspect of sovereignty into politics-suggesting that sovereign relations are
predicated upon an irrational, nonobjective, nonverbal acceptance of political
power and arguing that sovereign legitimacy rests upon a miraculous absence of
legality. 11
This interpretation of law, politics, and the exception leads Schmitt to a
second important point. In elaborating on the relationship between society and
the sovereign, he argues that "the political is the total, and as a result we know
that any decision about whether something is unpolitical is always apolitical
decision.' 2 This may seem like an obvious statement, especially for critics of
liberalism, but it is worth emphasizing its juridical implications. What Schmitt
suggests is the impossibility of a truly apolitical juridical system in any realm-
authoritarian or liberal. 13 In addition to positing the simultaneously normative
and miraculous nature of the state of exception, Schmitt also suggests that the
state of exception produces a total state where the primary difference between
or among political structures is a metaphysical one-the choice is between an
unexamined political life and a self-conscious one, not between the political
and the apolitical.14
In Concept of the Political, Schmitt discusses two final characteristics of
the state of exception that are important in relation to contemporary
8. See id. at 36-37 (arguing that modem theories of the state may only be understood as
secularized theological theories and discussing this notion in relation to the state of exception).
9. Id. at36.
10. Compare id. at 7 ("Although [the sovereign] stands outside the normally valid legal
system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who must decide whether the constitution needs
to be suspended in its entirety."), with id. at 36 ("[T]he transgression of the laws of nature
[occur] through an exception brought about by direct intervention, as is found in the idea of a
miracle.").
11. See generally CARL ScHMrrr, LEGALITY AND LEGrIMACY (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., Duke
Univ. Press 2004) (1932) (expanding on the tension between legality and legitimacy).
12. ScHMIrr, supra note 5, at 2.
13. See id. ("We have come to recognize that the political is the total, and.., any decision
about whether something is unpolitical is always a political decision, irrespective of who
decides and what reasons are advanced.").
14. See id. (discussing Protestant theology and the creation of a "supposedly unpolitical
doctrine" but concluding that the "political is the total").
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international and Turkish rape law: first, the centrality of the "friend/enemy
distinction" to political identity formation,' 5 and second, the role war plays as a
manifestation of this distinction. 16 According to Schmitt, the basic function of
a political order is to decide who will play the role of public friend and who
will play the role of public enemy. 7 Far more important to law and politics
than the question of individual life or death is the question of collective
political existence or collective political nonexistence.' 8 Moreover, to the
extent that the friend/enemy distinction plays out in practice, Schmitt posits
warfare as its most significant manifestation. War, he argues, "is neither the
aim nor the purpose nor even the very content of politics. But, as an ever
present possibility, it is the leading presupposition which determines in a
characteristic way human action and thinking and thereby creates a specifically
political behavior."' 9 Politics-as-law is thus likewise politics-as-war---even if
waging war is neither the aim nor the purpose of political structures.
As Giacomo Marramao argues, this construction of the friend/enemy
distinction and its relationship to the state of exception suggests a number of
further corollaries.2 ° Schmitt, for example, creates a situation in which "the
closer a grouping comes to the extremity and purity of the friend-enemy
antithesis, the more political it is.",21 As a result, "any aggregation of intensity
close to the friend-enemy antithesis itself acquires an exquisitely political
character, excluding the fact that it is manifested in religious... national.., or
economic.., areas., 22  Furthermore, Giorgio Agamben notes that the
"temporary" collapse of law into politics that defines the state of exception is
15. See CARL ScHMTTr, CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 26 (George Schwab trans., Univ. of
Chi. Press 1996) (1932) ("The specific political distinction to which political actions and
motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy.").
16. See id. at 35 ("War as the most extreme political means discloses the possibility which
underlies every political idea, namely, the distinction of friend and enemy.").
17. See id. at 28-30 (discussing the importance of public enemies and the role of the State
in determining the friend-enemy distinction).
18. Schmitt states:
The authority to decide, in the form of a verdict on life and death, thejus vitae ac
necis, can also belong to another nonpolitical order within the political entity, for
instance, to the family or the head of the household, but not the right of a hostis
declaration as long as the political entity is an actuality and possesses thejus belli.
Id. at 47.
19. Id. at 34.
20. See Giacomo Marramao, The Exile of the Nomos: For a Critical Profile of Carl
Schmitt, 21 CARDozo L. REv. 1567, 1578 (2000) (discussing two consequences of the
friend/enemy distinction).
21. Id. at 1579.
22. Id.
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quickly becoming the norm: "[O]ne of the essential characteristics of the state
of exception-the provisional abolition of the distinction among legislative,
executive, and judicial powers-here shows its tendency to become a lasting
practice of government. '23  More importantly, Agamben emphasizes the
peculiarly spatial manifestation of the state of exception, arguing that it
"represents the inclusion and capture of a space that is neither outside nor
inside,, 24 and that "the state of exception is not a dictatorship... but a space
devoid of law, a zone of anomie, in which all legal determinations-and above
all the very distinction between public and private-are deactivated.
25
Taken together, therefore, these analyses provide a number of insights into
the state of exception. First of all, the state of exception produces (or,
according to Agamben, is) a particular kind of political space. This political
space is simultaneously outside and inside, temporary and permanent, and
exceptional and normal. It is in every way a limitless space. Moreover, as
Schmitt makes clear, it is not just that these apparently contradictory, defining
characteristics of exceptional space exist alongside one another, but that they
also imply one another.26 The "miraculous" legitimizing function of the
temporary exception reinforces the "rational" legality of the permanent norm,
even as it violates and suspends it. Indeed, it is upon precisely the irrational,
nonverbal, nonobjective, miraculous violation of the norm that sovereign
power-and thus the norm-rests.
Second, the collapse of law into politics produces a politically-total
version of sovereignty. There is no public and private, no political and
apolitical. Decisions about what should operate outside the realm of the
political are emphatically political themselves, and the only real choice that
exists in this space is between denying the reality of politics and accepting it.
Finally, the basic, and indeed, only function of exceptional politics, is to decide
on the public friend and the public enemy. As a result, all relationships-
economic, social, religious and, I will also suggest, sexual and reproductive-
are inherently political because they necessarily tend toward reinforcing the
friend/enemy distinction. There is no relationship in the state of exception that
is not in some way aimed at describing this political opposition.
23. AGAMBEN, supra note 6, at 7.
24. Id. at 35.
25. Id. at 50.
26. See ScHMrrr, supra note 5, at 14-15 (discussing the importance of the exception and
its relation to the norm).
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II1. Rape and the State of Exception in International Law
I would like to discuss the ways in which these theories of the state of
exception have played out in practice-particularly the forms they have taken
in the decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY)--starting with the ICTY's ruling in the February 22, 2001
Kunarac trial,27 which addressed accusations of mass rape in the Bosnian town
ofFo~a.28 A number of scholars have praised this ruling as a watershed in both
international and national rape law because it affirmed and expanded what
Debra Bergoffen has called "the principle of embodied subjectivity. ' 29 Most
notably, the ICTY resituated the concept of "consent" for the purposes of rape
law, effectively eliminating the possibility of a consent defense in a wartime
rape or genocidal rape trial. 30 As Bergoffen argues, "in insisting on proof of
genuine consent, the court determined that the situation of the woman, her
capacity to give consent, not the quota of violence inflicted on her body,
determines whether or not rape occurred."' 1 Kirsten Campbell has likewise
noted that the court "now understands the crime as a violation of autonomy,"
and that consent, therefore, "must be given voluntarily, as a result of the
victim's free will, assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances.
'" 32
All of this makes a great deal of sense. Clearly, consent means something
quite different in a state of war than it does under "normal" circumstances, and
the notion of a consent defense in a trial for genocidal rape is in many ways a
disturbing one. At the same time, it is worth emphasizing what the implications
of these ICTY rulings are in this redefinition of sexual crime. Basically, the
court has moved away from a situation in which sex is a noncriminal act that, in
certain circumstances (i.e., the absence of consent), becomes criminal and has
moved toward a situation in which sex is a criminal act that, in certain
27. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Judgment of the Trial Court (Feb. 22,
2001) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. See, e.g., id. 28, 30 (describing the conditions in Fo~a and the brutal rape of its
female inhabitants).
29. Debra Bergoffen, February 22, 2001: Toward a Politics of the Vulnerable Body, 18
HYPATIA 116, 117 (2003).
30. See Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-T, 438,442 (broadening the concept of rape by
considering factors other than physical force, which may affect a woman's ability to consent).
31. Bergoffen, supra note 29, at 118. She also argues that "in focusing on the matter of
consent and in using criteria of consent, rather than criteria of violence or pain, for determining
whether or not a crime against humanity occurred, the court took note of the relationship
between a woman's humanity and her sexual integrity." Id. at 119.
32. Kirsten Campbell, Rape as a "Crime Against Humanity": Trauma, Law, and Justice
in the ICTY, 2 J. HUM. RTs. 507, 508-09 (2003) (citations omitted).
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circumstances (i.e., the presence of consent), becomes acceptable.33 The
assumption in the latter is that sex is an act of bodily harm. Sex is a violation
of bodily integrity. It undermines an individual's dignity and autonomy. The
role of consent, therefore, is to mitigate the effects of these violations. In the
very process of reinforcing women's subjectivity-by eliminating the
humiliating effects of considering consent alone in rape legislation (effectively
placing the burden of proof on the victim to show that she did not in fact "want
it")-contemporary international law is effectively criminalizing all sex. Rape
is a crime not because there is an absence of consent but because sex is an
assault on politically defined bodily borders. The purpose of proving consent
is, again, simply to turn what is already a crime-sex-into something slightly
less horrific.
In a very straightforward way, therefore, the ICTY rulings have, first,
turned women's bodies into political spaces in constant need of protection and,
second, turned sex into something inherently criminal that, like torture, cries
out for regulation. More than that, as Karen Engle has argued, both the ICTY
rulings and the rhetoric surrounding them have "reiflied] ethnic difference,
diminishing women's capacity to engage in sexual activity with the 'enemy'
during the war. 3 4 Indeed, although the "consent defense was most restricted in
the appeals decision in Kunarac," Engle notes that the ICTY's "broad reading
of 'armed conflict' suggests that all sexual relationships between Bosnian
Muslim civilians and Serbian soldiers in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be seen
as nonconsensual, expanding the reach of Kunarac well beyond Fo~a."35
Finally, Engle suggests that this increasingly tight association between national
identity and sexuality became particularly insistent in discussions of forced
pregnancy, where "the coercive nature of rape 36 played no role: "If a Serbian
sperm implanted in a Muslim egg creates a Serbian child, lack of consent is not
necessary to this outcome. Thus, all children born of such a union, consensual
or not, would be not Muslim.
3 7
We are presented, in other words, with a number of consequences of these
ICTY rulings. The first is the blanket criminalization of sex-a criminalization
predicated upon (a) defining certain political bodies as necessarily "violated,"
33. See Karen Engle, Feminism and its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape'in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 778, 804 (2005) ("[T]he ICTY's jurisprudence
essentially makes consensual sexual relationships legally impossible, in some sets of
circumstances, which would include those found in Foda.").
34. Id. at 784.
35. Id. at 803-06.
36. Id. at 794.
37. Id.
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and (b) defining certain political spaces as "inherently coercive." Second, as
Engle notes, this interpretation of sexual crime insists upon the reification of
national difference. Bosnian women, according to this argument, are incapable
of having legal sex with Serbian men. To the extent that sex occurs, it is a
purely political act reinforcing the notion of the Bosnian/Serbian or
friend/enemy distinction. The ICTY's interpretation of rape as a crime against
humanity, therefore, produces a situation in which Bosnian women become
political spaces determined above all by the state of war (or state of exception).
The "crime" of sex becomes licit within these spaces if and only ifit occurs as a
means of reinforcing the Bosnian/Serbian or friend/enemy distinction. The
ICTY's rape rulings can, in turn, only make sense if we assume that they were
handed down within a state of exception.
The rhetoric surrounding the ICTY's rulings-both supportive and
critical-makes this assumption of a state of exception, if anything, more
obvious. It is in fact worth pointing out that the critics of this new legislation
are by no means critical because they worry about the disappearance of
women's political and sexual agency in recent sex law. Rather, their argument
almost without fail is that the ICTY did not go far enough in declaring the
exceptional nature of sexual crime. As early as 1996, for example, scholars
were condemning, above all, the court's "legalism. 3 8 Ten years later, in the
wake of Kunarac, the ICTY was likewise critiqued for failing to "address the
nuances of... genocidal sexual terrorism. 3 9 Meanwhile, scholars of nation-
state-based jurisprudence used these critiques of international law as ajumping-
off point for applying and extending the ICTY's rulings to rape law in general.
In 1997, for example, Amy E. Ray invoked the Bosnian genocide as part of a
more general call for a redefinition of both war and rape:
[G]iven the emphasis on invasion of physical territory as the impetus of
war... we may be able to reconceive the notion of "war" in order to make
human rights laws applicable to women "in the by-ways of daily life." We
could... argu[e] that women's bodies are the physical territory at issue in a
war perpetrated by men against women.40
38. See Liz Philipose, The Laws of War and Women's Human Rights, 11 HYPATIA 46,47-
48 (1996) (arguing that the ICTY's adoption of rape as a crime against humanity only applies in
the context of ethnic cleansing and thus is too narrow).
39. Veronica C. Abreu, Women's Bodies as Battlefields in the Former Yugoslavia: An
Argument for the Prosecution of Sexual Terrorism as Genocide and for the Recognition of
Genocidal Sexual Terrorism as a Violation of Jus Cogens Under International Law, 6 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 1, 18 (2005).
40. Amy E. Ray, The Shame of It: Gender-Based Terrorism in the Former Yugoslavia
and the Failure of International Human Rights Law to Contemplate the Injuries, 46 AM. UNIV.
L. REv. 793, 838 (1997).
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Throughout 2005 and 2006, Catharine MacKinnon popularized and simplified
this view. After presenting talks to a number United States law faculties
throughout 2004 and 2005, she published an article in the Harvard
International Law Journal, in which she argued that women are involved in a
"constant civil war":
[I]f violence against women were considered a war inside one country...
much of what happens to women every day all over the world would be
crisply prohibited by the clear language of Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions .... [T]he absence, for women around the world
outside what are termed zones of conflict, of such guarantees for
noncombatants in war puts women in the practical position of being
combatants in daily hostilities, while at the same time generally being
unarmed and considered criminals if they fight back .... [International
law] does not envision conflicts in which it is... the boundaries of the
person as a member of a group that are transgressed, and the sovereignty of
members of a group of people to live life every single day that is
infringed.41
What do these approaches have in common? First of all, as early as 1996
and 1997, advocates of a new rape law criticized something called "legalism."
International legal norms were not enough because they did not sufficiently
address rape as a violation of women's human rights.42 What was necessary,
therefore, was an exception, a violation of these formal norms that would
legitimize women's sovereign status and therefore their relationship to law.
What, after all, is "genocidal sexual terrorism"-occurring as it does in both
times of war and times of peace-if not an act that assumes a state of
exception? Objective, formal legal norms will never be developed to define, in
the abstract, a "genocidal sexually terrorist behavior" that might then be applied
to some individual accused of transgressing these norms. Instead, genocidal
sexual terrorism is a decisionist concept that exists in exceptional space and
assumes the suspension of law along with the hyperbolic legitimization of
politics. Genocidal sexual terrorism has meaning only given the prior existence
of a public friend/public enemy distinction.
But this friend/enemy distinction does not necessarily manifest itself solely
in national or ethnic terms. As the passages from Ray and MacKinnon make
clear, the distinction becomes even more obvious when the state of war is
mobilized to remedy the jurisprudence of daily life. In both of these passages,
41. Catharine MacKinnon, Women's September 11 th: Rethinking the International Law
of Conflict, 47 HARv. INT'L L.J. 1, 8, 15-16 (2005).
42. See id. at 15 (discussing the historical role of international law in state regulation and
its unwillingness to regulate the actions of individuals).
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war, as Schmitt puts it, "may not be the aim, the purpose, nor even the very
content of politics. But it is an ever present possibility, ',43 and our political
behavior must be specifically geared toward the reality of politics as war.
Moreover, if national or international juridical systems are going to address this
reality-the fact that women are the victims of constant, daily wartime
violence-these systems need to do so not by legislating formal law, but instead
by placing women into legally defined lawless space. Women need to inhabit
"zones of conflict." If a woman exists, around her must extend lawless,
exceptional, wartime space. Once this new politics has been established,
women might then be protected by the Geneva Conventions, and this is a good
thing.
Again, I want to emphasize this point: It is not by legislation that sexual
crime will be addressed. It is by placing women, the victims of sexual crime,
into the miraculous space defined by the state of exception. Doing so will
restore "sovereignty" to women. Just as Schmitt saw civil war as "the ever-
imminent normal state of affairs to which the sovereign state is the exceptional
solution," and suggested "a kind of dictatorship that has as its sole task guarding
the ever-present exception," 44 Ray implicitly and MacKinnon explicitly see
constant "civil war" as the normal state of affairs that must also be addressed by
redefining sovereign space as exceptional space. They go even further than
Schmitt, however, by simultaneously imagining this exceptional sovereign
space as a space enclosed by the "boundaries" of a woman's body rather than
by the boundaries of a nation-state-boundaries that indeed become more
political than those of the nation-state, impervious to transgression, be it legal,
political, military, sexual, or biological.
IV Rape and the State of Exception in Turkish Law
How, then, have these interpretations influenced Turkish law? First of all,
as I noted above, the articles addressing sexual crime in the 2004 Turkish
criminal code are explicitly indebted to the trends in international rape law that
the ICTY rulings initiated-indeed they conform more closely to these
international norms than rape legislation in many other European states. 45 In
43. SCHMITT, supra note 15, at 34.
44. John P. McCormick, The Dilemmas of Dictatorship: Carl Schmitt and Constitutional
Emergency Powers, 10 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE. 163, 169 (1997).
45. France and Italy are the most notable, although both these countries' rape laws have
moved in a similar direction as Turkey. See CODE PENAL [C. PI] arts. 222-23 (Fr.), reprinted
in 31 THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES 109 (Edward M. Wise ed., Edward A.
Tomlinson trans., Fred B. Rothman Publ'ns 1999) ("Every act of sexual penetration, ofany kind
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the Turkish code, rape is defined as a "crime against sexual inviolability," and
anyone who violates another's "bodily inviolability by sexual conduct" is
punished.46 The penalty is increased if the violation involves "entering an
organ or device into the body." Spouses can be punished for violating one
another, and the penalty is more severe when rape is committed by those in
"public authority" or with "authority arising in working relations. '47 If there is
a blood relationship, if a gun or multiple people are involved, or if the victim
cannot protect him or herself bodily or psychologically, the penalty is also
heavier.48 Loss of health, recourse to battery, and use of force resulting in the
victim's entry into a vegetative state or resulting in death all increase the
penalty.
49
In the Turkish code, bodily inviolability-linked to political subjectivity-
is privileged above all else and is the object of attack in sexual crime. Sex is a
violation of bodily borders, a trespass on political space. Sex is a crime against
the integrity of this space, and therefore, it is the duty of the state to protect and
to monitor the borders surrounding this space. Just as the ICTY paid little or
no attention to consent or agency in defining and punishing sexual crime, here
consent is also almost completely marginalized. At issue in the code is not the
sexual agency of the Turkish citizenry but rather its security against potential
threats to their simultaneously political and bodily borders. Indeed, this is
made explicit in the very terminology used to describe bodily integrity-a
terminology that obviously gets at the political nature of the crime.
Literally, cinsel dokunulmazlik means "bodily integrity," with the word
cinsel a combination of "sexual," "generic," and "bodily," and dokunulmaz
hovering somewhere among "inviolability," "political immunity," and most
literally "untouchability." In Turkish, the phrase "bodily integrity" evokes-
just as it does in English and French-mixed and overlapping connotations of
biology, sexuality, uniformity, political identity, citizenship, and physical
proximity. Thus, an attack on "bodily inviolability" is in no way a crime
against "the individual" or the individual's ability to choose to engage in sexual
activity. It is no more an attack on these things in the Turkish code than it was
in the ICTY rulings or in the critiques of these rulings. It is a crime against
whatsoever, committed on the person of another by violence, compulsion, threat, or surprise is a
rape."); Amy Jo Everhart, Predicting the Effect of Italy's Long A waited Rape Law Reform on
"The Land of Machismo," 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 671, 692-95 (1998) (discussing the
important changes of the Italian Parliament's 1996 amendment to the country's rape law).
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simultaneous bodily and political boundaries-an assault on the Turkish nation-
state via trespass of the biological barriers surrounding the sexualized citizen's
body. It is a crime that can make sense only once the political, the legal, and
the biological have collapsed into one another, only once a friend/enemy
distinction has been established, and, in turn, only once a state of exception has
been declared.
V. Conclusion
The new rape legislation in Turkey is thus a significant step forward in the
Turkish government's quest to become recognized as "European." Turkey is a
Muslim country with a foundational political ideology that places it squarely
within Europe. It is the inheritor of a long-standing tension between
"authenticity" and "civilization" that has been made only more complicated by
its quasi-colonized position in relation to various European powers. But if our
question is whether Turkey should or should not join the European Union-if
our question is whether Turkish legal reform has or has not brought Turkey
closer to that goal-it may be that these issues are less central than many
scholars have assumed them to be. Perhaps a more pressing question to ask is
what it means when crime-and sex crime in particular-is redefined in a
country, like Turkey, as a means of appealing to a political grouping, like the
European Union, which has wholeheartedly bought into its rhetoric of
liberalism while ignoring its century-long tradition of authoritarianism and
exceptionalism. What does it mean when the state of exception is mobilized as
a means of preserving liberal values? And what does it mean, especially, when
rape law is the target of these exceptional politics?
I have tried in this Comment to address these questions in a broad-but
obviously incomplete-way. The state of exception, as it was theorized in the
1920s and 1930s by Carl Schmitt, appears to be alive and well in national,
regional, and international politics. It has, without question, influenced the
rulings of the ICTY, and likewise influenced the advocacy that both commends
and criticizes these rulings. It has made possible the mobilization of
"international" legislation in the name of "European" civilization, 50 and it has
therefore provided an invisible framework for the Turkish legislation that seeks
to turn Turkey into a European state. When I say that Turkish, European, and
international rape law demands the imposition of a state of exception, however,
50. See Joanne Conaghan, Extending the Reach of Human Rights to Encompass Victims
of Rape: M.C. v. Bulgaria, 13 FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 145, 146-56 (2005) (discussing
international law in the rulings of the European Court of Human Rights).
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I should be clear that my goal is not simply to provoke or to suggest that these
legal systems are embedded in an authoritarian or fascist tradition. Rather, I am
trying to shift a number of key discussions that occur and recur around gender-
relevant legislative change, and in particular around gender-relevant legislative
change on the so-called margins of Europe or margins of the Muslim world:
discussions about the meaning and purpose of sex law, about the relationship
between sex crime and national or civilizational identity, and about the nature
of sexual or political subjectivity. At the same time, although my intention is
not merely to provoke, I will end this Comment with what is perhaps a
confrontational question: Is European Union membership really worth turning
the state of Turkey into Fo~a?
